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Abstract 
Given the dearth of research regarding the relations of trait fear and trait anxiety to cognitive control 
processes, we sought to investigate how trait fear and trait anxiety are uniquely related to inhibitory 
control, which is a crucial component of the regulatory processes that inhibit inappropriate responses 
that interfere with goal achievement. Given that inhibitory control tasks are often plagued by task-
impurity issues, we employed a latent variable approach based on multiple measures of inhibitory 
control. We found that trait fear and trait anxiety are related but separable constructs that, when their 
shared variance was controlled for, predicted inhibitory control positively and negatively, 
respectively. Also, the unique negative relation between trait anxiety and inhibitory control was 
evident only for females. Our findings underscore distinct contributions of trait fear and trait anxiety 
to inhibitory control and the consideration of affective traits as multidimensional (e.g., valence and 
motivation) constructs to better understand the relation between negative affectivity and cognitive 
processes. 
 
 
Keywords 
Fear, Anxiety, Traits, Negative affectivity, Inhibitory control 
 
  
 2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although extensive research has shed light on the cognitive correlates of negative affectivity (i.e., 
dispositional tendency to experience and express more frequent, intense, or enduring negative 
emotions), the associations between discrete negative affectivity and cognitive processes are still 
poorly understood (Shackman et al., 2016). Two relevant negative emotions of interest are fear and 
anxiety, as they are highly prevalent emotions that affect everyday behaviors. At healthy levels, fear 
and anxiety, as closely related emotions, facilitate adaptive responses to threats in order to preserve 
safety and well-being. At maladaptive levels, however, they are implicated in health problems and 
psychiatric disorders (Sylvers, Lilienfeld & LaPrairie, 2011). Although prior studies have 
predominantly treated fear and anxiety as analogous constructs (for a similar argument, 
see Sylvers et al., 2011), some empirical evidence suggests the contrary, thus supporting the 
distinction between fear and anxiety. Given these starkly different arguments, we sought to examine 
whether trait-level fear and anxiety would be similarly or differentially related to inhibitory control, a 
crucial component of cognitive and emotional regulation, which refers to an ability to inhibit goal-
irrelevant interferences (distracting information) in order to achieve goals. Considering that inhibitory 
control has been shown to influence several key aspects of life, such as mental health (e.g., addiction 
or depression), physical health (e.g., overeating, substance abuse), and marital harmony 
(Diamond, 2013), understanding the relation of trait-level fear and anxiety to inhibitory control is 
vital. 
Although both fear and anxiety are characterized by apprehensive anticipation of impending danger, 
one of the key distinctions between them is the specificity of the threat. With fear, there is an 
identifiable threat located in the environment that requires the recruitment of more controlled, top-
down cognitive processes to manage the threat (Öhman, 2008). With anxiety, however, the nature of 
the threat is more ambiguous, which in turn impedes the efficiency to actively engage strategies and 
behaviors to deal with the threat (Öhman, 2008). Evidence from past studies supports this distinction 
between fear and anxiety. At the neuroanatomical level, although both fear and anxiety are subserved 
by the extended amygdala complex, the central nucleus of the amygdala is more strongly involved in 
fear, whereas the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis is more closely associated with anxiety 
(Walker, Toufexis & Davis, 2003). Additionally, behavioral genetics studies suggest that fear-related 
disorders (e.g., animal and situational phobias) and anxiety-related disorders (e.g., generalized anxiety 
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder) are separable and associated with distinct genetic factors 
(Hettema, Prescott, Myers, Neale & Kendler, 2005). Further, while increased physiological responses 
(e.g., heart rate acceleration) accompany both fear-related and anxiety-related stimuli, anxiety-related 
disorders are also associated with elevated resting heart rate and skin conductance levels (Orr & 
Roth, 2000). Together, there is converging evidence that fear and anxiety are related, but dissociable, 
processes. 
Given these distinctions between fear and anxiety, an important question is whether fear and anxiety 
would uniquely influence inhibitory control. From a theoretical standpoint, the revised reinforcement 
sensitivity theory proposes that different anatomical systems underlie fear and anxiety in terms of 
approach/avoid motivation (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Specifically, the fight-flight-freeze system 
(FFFS), which is activated by threatening stimuli, mediates fear and is associated with avoidance 
behaviors. The behavioral approach system (BAS), which is activated by appetitive stimuli, mediates 
anticipatory pleasure and is associated with approach behaviors. Lastly, the behavioral inhibition 
system (BIS)—which is activated by goal conflicts, particularly between approach (BAS) and 
avoidance (FFFS)—mediates anxiety, especially in circumstances in which the threatening stimuli 
cannot be avoided and must be faced. Notably, in line with our proposed fear-anxiety distinction, the 
threat is more explicit and definite in the FFFS than in the BIS (i.e., actual versus potential danger). In 
view of this, motivational differences between fear and anxiety likely engender dissimilar outcomes in 
inhibitory control. Specifically, fear (as driven by the FFFS) may require the recruitment of more 
controlled, top-down cognitive processes to avoid the explicit threat (Öhman, 2008). On the other 
hand, the nature of the threat for anxiety (as driven by the BIS) is more ambiguous, and therefore 
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anxiety may impede the ability to actively engage strategies and behaviors to deal with the threat 
(Öhman, 2008). 
In a similar vein, Harmon-Jones, Gable and Price (2013) maintain that emotions that are high and low 
in motivational intensity—which refers to the strength of the urge to move toward or away from a 
stimulus—narrow and broaden the scope of attention, respectively. Specifically, fear likely signifies 
higher motivational intensity, owing to the strong desire to recoil from a specific negative stimulus, 
while anxiety reflects lower motivational intensity (Zhou & Siu, 2015) due to the ambiguity of the 
threat. Therefore, the apparent threat specificity and high motivational approach that are characteristic 
of fear could engender more selective attentional processes that implicate the suppression of 
distracting information, i.e., more proficient inhibitory control. Conversely, anxiety, owing to its 
lower motivational intensity and threat ambiguity, would likely be concomitant with lower inhibitory 
control. This is further supported by the attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & 
Calvo, 2007), which posits that anxiety engenders greater distractibility by increasing the influence of 
the stimulus-driven (bottom-up) attentional system and impairing the goal-directed (top-down) 
attentional system. Hence, the threat specificity and motivational intensity components of fear and 
anxiety would engender different outcomes in inhibitory control: Fear likely enhances inhibitory 
control, while anxiety hampers it. 
Consistent with the notion above, experimental findings substantiate the divergent effects of fear and 
anxiety on inhibitory control. For instance, higher trait anxiety was associated with poorer 
performance on various measures that require the inhibition of irrelevant distractors (e.g., flanker task, 
attention network task, irrelevant-singleton paradigm) and prepotent responses (e.g., antisaccade and 
the Stroop tasks), even in the absence of threat-related stimuli (Bishop, 2009; Derakshan, Smyth & 
Eysenck, 2009; Fox, 1993; Moser, Becker & Moran, 2012; Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, Callejas & 
Lupiáñez, 2010; cf. Derakshan et al., 2009; Eysenck & Byrne, 1992). In contrast, fear has been shown 
to facilitate the top-down inhibition of distractor interference. Fear-induced participants exhibited 
better inhibitory control (as assessed by the flanker and Attention Network Tasks) than control 
participants, thereby indicating that fear is better able to suppress irrelevant information 
(Finucane, 2011; Finucane & Power, 2010). Given the malleable nature of inhibitory control in 
response to experiential inputs (Diamond, 2013), the aforementioned studies suggest that individual 
differences in experiences of fear and anxiety may manifest different relations with inhibitory control. 
Despite the general consistency of findings in the literature, it is still premature to draw definitive 
conclusions due to the notable drawback of using a single task to assess inhibitory control 
(e.g., Bishop, 2009; Finucane, 2011). This is quite problematic, because inhibitory control measures 
typically assess more than just inhibitory control abilities, as evidenced by the low—and often 
statistically nonsignificant—correlations between various measures of inhibitory control (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004). For instance, the color-word Stroop and the arrow flanker tasks tap not only inhibitory 
control but also task-specific abilities to recognize and discriminate colors and arrows, respectively. 
Crucially, task-specific idiosyncrasies may not only give rise to spurious positive findings but also 
potentially mask the genuine relations between inhibitory control and fear/anxiety, which could result 
in low correlations or even null findings (e.g., Eysenck & Byrne, 1992). Therefore, more rigorous 
methodological and statistical approaches are needed to circumvent the task-impurity problem. 
To address this issue, we sought to assess the associations of trait fear and trait anxiety with inhibitory 
control by using a latent-variable approach based on multiple measures of inhibitory control, while 
controlling for common covariates (e.g., gender, age, socioeconomic status). Departing from previous 
studies that have relied on single-task measures (e.g., Bishop, 2009; Finucane, 2011), this latent 
variable approach allowed us to obtain a purer estimation of inhibitory control by accounting for 
measurement errors, thereby addressing the task-impurity problem. 
Further, although the reviewed empirical evidence suggests that fear and anxiety are, respectively, 
positively (Finucane, 2011; Finucane & Power, 2010) and negatively (Fox, 1993; Moser et al., 
2012; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010) associated with inhibitory control, two major issues remain 
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unresolved. First, since most previous findings were established at the state level as derived from 
mood-induction procedures—which more strongly activate the motivational aspects of affective 
experiences—it is not clear whether trait-level fear and anxiety would yield comparable findings. 
Corroborating this notion, prior work has shown that state anxiety and trait anxiety are dissimilarly 
related to certain aspects (i.e., alerting and orienting) of inhibitory control tasks (i.e., Attention 
Network Task; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010). Second, given the multidimensional nature of affective 
traits (e.g., positive/negative valence, approach/avoid motivation), there may be trait-specific 
components (e.g., negative valence) that are not necessarily associated with inhibitory control 
(Gustavson et al., 2019). 
Therefore, using a latent variable approach that allows unbiased estimation of parameters, we 
examined whether trait fear and trait anxiety would be uniquely related to inhibitory control when the 
shared variance between trait fear and trait anxiety was controlled for. Specifically, drawing on the 
evidence reviewed above, we hypothesized that higher trait fear would be uniquely related with more 
enhanced inhibitory control, while higher trait anxiety would be uniquely associated with impaired 
inhibitory control. In addition, given that females are more anxiety-prone and susceptible to anxiety-
related disorders than males (Bernstein, Zvolensky, Stewart, Nancy Comeau & Leen-Feldner, 
2006; Chambless & Mason, 1986; Lake, Eaves, Maes, Heath & Martin, 2000; Lewinsohn, Gotlib, 
Lewinsohn, Seeley & Allen, 1998; Zvolensky, McNeil, Porter & Stewart, 2001), we inquired whether 
gender would moderate the unique relation of anxiety with inhibitory control. Notably, we 
conjectured that the specific effects of anxiety on inhibitory control may be more pronounced for 
females than for males. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
One hundred and seventy-five undergraduates (Mage = 21.59 years, SD = 1.83; 66.3% female) from a 
local university in Singapore participated in the study for course credit or a monetary reward (S$30). 
As the data used for this experiment were part of a larger study, only relevant variables are reported1. 
Our sample size was guided by several considerations. First, the sample size of N = 175 is consistent 
with recommendations that a minimum sample size of 150 is appropriate for structural equation 
models (SEM) with seven or fewer constructs (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2009; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). Further, our sample size is comparable with past studies that have relied on multiple 
measures to assess inhibitory control (e.g., N = 130 to 171; Miyake et al., 2000; Unsworth, Fukuda, 
Awh & Vogel, 2014). Lastly, a more recent simulation study by Wolf, Harrington, Clark and 
Miller (2013) suggests that a minimum sample size of approximately 160 cases is required for the 
model with three latent factors and eight indicators when all factor loadings are set to 0.50. Given that 
our present SEM model has three latent factors and 10 indicators in total, a sample size smaller than 
160 would be sufficient. 
3. Materials 
3.1. Fear and anxiety 
To investigate individual differences in trait fear and trait anxiety in nonclinical populations, we opted 
for measures that tap general affective and personality traits. To this end, we employed the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T), which are 
widely used measures of trait affectivity (e.g., De Young et al., 2013; Eysenck & Byrne, 1992; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001; Moser et al., 2012; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010; Ready et al., 2011). Participants 
reported the extent (1 = never, 5 = always) to which they generally experience fear (i.e., afraid, 
scared, nervous, jittery) and anxiety (i.e., distressed) on the PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1988). The four items selected to index the latent fear factor constitute part of the fear subscale in the 
expanded version of the PANAS (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1992), which showed positive 
correlations between self- and aggregated ratings from well-acquainted peers (r = 0.40) and with other 
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construct-similar scales (e.g., the Tension-Anxiety subscale of the Profile of Mood States; 
r = 0.85; Watson & Clark, 1999), thereby indicating convergent validity. 
Anxiety was assessed by the 20-item State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Version (STAI-T; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983; 1 = almost never, 4 = almost always), which 
demonstrated convergent validity, as evidenced by positive correlations with other anxiety scales 
(Stanley, Beck & Zebb, 1996; Watson & Clark, 1984). To reduce the number of items from the  
STAI-T, we used factorial algorithms to create two parcels that are 10-item mean scores of the 20-
item scale. Parceling, which is appropriate for unidimensional scales such as the STAI-T, has been 
shown to have better psychometric properties (i.e., higher reliability and communality) and model-fit 
advantages (Little, Cunningham, Shahar & Widaman, 2002). Here, all items in the STAI-T were 
assigned to the two parcels to achieve roughly equal factor loadings. 
3.2. Inhibitory control 
Three inhibitory control tasks (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) assessed the resistance to distractor 
interference. In the modified Eriksen flanker task, participants saw a row of five letters and had to 
identify, as quickly and accurately as possible, the central target letter (i.e., G or H), which could be 
congruent (e.g., HHHHH) or incongruent (e.g., GGHGG) with the surrounding four letters. For every 
trial, a central fixation point (350 ms) was first presented, followed by the target stimulus, which 
remained on the screen for 2000 ms or until a response was made. A blank screen was then shown 
(250 ms) before the next trial began. To increase task difficulty, the central target letter was 
sometimes displaced from its central position (vigilance trials; e.g., GG HGG). Participants had to 
press the spacebar instead of identifying the central target letter. Eighty-five congruent, 85 
incongruent, and 30 vigilance trials were randomly presented. As vigilance trials were not related to 
our study's hypotheses, we excluded those from analysis. 
The other two inhibitory control tasks were methodologically similar, except for the stimuli 
employed. In the modified arrow flanker task, participants had to discern the direction of the central 
arrow (i.e., left or right), which could be similar to (e.g., <<<<<) or dissimilar from (e.g., <<><<) the 
surrounding four arrows. In the modified color flanker task, participants had to classify the color of 
the central box (i.e., green or red), which could be the same color as the other four colored boxes or a 
different color. The dependent variable in each task was reverse-coded bin scores, which comprised 
both accuracy and latency. Based on Hughes, Linck, Bowles, Koeth, and Bunting (2014) binning 
procedure, we excluded the following: (a) incorrect trials, (b) trials with RTs below 200 ms, and (c) 
trials with RTs that departed from each participant's mean by more than 3 SD. Subsequently, the mean 
RT of congruent trials was subtracted from every incongruent trial RT for each participant. Next, all 
participants’ difference scores were rank-ordered into deciles and assigned bin values of 1 through 10 
to signify the fastest and slowest 10% of the group, respectively; inaccurate incongruent trials were 
assigned bin values of 20. Last, for each participant, a single bin score was obtained by dividing the 
sum of the bin values from the accurate and inaccurate trials by the total number of incongruent trials; 
bin scores were reverse-coded by multiplying by −1 so that higher values denote better performance. 
Bin scores afford better reliability, validity, and sensitivity in the detection of larger effect sizes than 
pure latency or accuracy scores (Hughes et al., 2014). 
3.3. Procedure 
The study was approved by the University's Institutional Review Board (IRB-17-081-A082(817)), and 
informed consent was obtained from all participants before the study began. The study comprised 
three sessions, with 1-week intervals between each session. In Session 1, participants completed a 
battery of questionnaires that included the PANAS, STAI-T, and demographics (e.g., gender, age, 
socioeconomic status). In Session 2, the modified Eriksen flanker task was administered along with 
other tasks. For Session 3, participants completed the modified arrow and color flanker tasks, 
interleaved with other measures. 
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4. Results 
All analyses were conducted with Mplus 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 2015) using the full information 
maximum likelihood procedure with robust standard errors. All reported estimates for our main 
findings were standardized to allow for comparisons between constructs with different measurement 
scales. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
We first assessed the measurement model, using confirmatory factor analysis, for the latent factors of 
fear (i.e., afraid, scared, nervous, jittery from the PANAS as indicators) and anxiety 
(i.e., distressed from the PANAS and two parcels from the STAI-T as indicators), which 
demonstrated a reasonable model fit, χ2(13) = 23.76, p = .033, RMSEA = 0.07, SRMR = 0.05, 
CFI = 0.98; all indicators significantly loaded on their respective latent factors (ps < 0.001), and the 
inter-factor correlation between fear and anxiety was 0.66 (p < .001). Further, following Crawford and 
Henry (2004), we correlated semantically similar items based on Zevon and Tellegen's (1982) mood 
content categories (i.e., scared and afraid; nervous and jittery). After correlating the error variance 
for scared and afraid and dropping the nonsignificant error covariance for nervous and jittery, the 
model had an excellent fit, χ2(12) = 9.81, p = .632, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.02, CFI = 1.00. We 
also compared this two-factor model with alternative models. Specifically, the one-factor (i.e., all 
seven indicators loading onto one factor; χ2(13) = 58.44, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.14, SRMR = 0.08, 
CFI = 0.91) and independent (i.e., constraining inter-factor correlations to zero; 
χ2(13) = 88.42, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.18, SRMR = 0.25, CFI = 0.86) models had poorer model fit. 
Moreover, the model in which nervous and jittery loaded onto trait anxiety, instead of trait fear, had a 
poorer fit to the data, χ2(13) = 58.44, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.14, SRMR = 0.08, CFI = 0.91, indicating 
that nervous and jittery reflect the latent factor of fear rather than anxiety. These findings demonstrate 
that the two-factor model was the best-fitting model with fear and anxiety as distinct, but correlated, 
constructs. 
Next, we assessed the full measurement model by including inhibitory control and the two-factor 
model of fear and anxiety. Model fit was excellent, χ2(31) = 37.59, p = .193, RMSEA = 0.04, 
SRMR = 0.03, CFI = 0.99. In the model, neither trait fear (φ = 0.17, SE = 0.10, p = .100) nor trait 
anxiety (φ = −0.04, SE = 0.10, p = .651) was significantly correlated with inhibitory control. 
However, when inhibitory control was regressed on trait fear and trait anxiety in the structural 
model—which partials out the shared variance between fear and anxiety—fear 
(γ = 0.41, SE = 0.16, p = .011) and anxiety (γ = −0.34, SE = 0.15, p = .027) positively and negatively 
predicted inhibitory control, respectively (Fig. 1). We further examined whether these unique relations 
would hold if the covariates of gender (0 = female, 1 = male), age (in years), and socioeconomic 
status (indexed by household income; 1 = less than S$2500, 9 = more than S$20,000) were controlled 
for. The model fit was good, χ2(58) = 72.05, p = .102, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, and 
the unique relations of fear (γ = 0.42, SE = 0.16, p = .008) and anxiety 
(γ = −0.33, SE = 0.15, p = .028) with inhibitory control remained significant; none of the covariates 
significantly predicted inhibitory control (γs = −0.05 to 0.16, ps > 0.16). Crucially, our findings 
demonstrate that fear and anxiety are uniquely and differentially related to inhibitory control, over and 
above the influence of covariates. 
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Fig. 1. Structural equation model of fear and anxiety predicting inhibitory control with standardized 
estimates. The two parcels from the STAI-T were denoted STAI-T 1 and 2. All estimates were 
significant at the 0.05 level, except for the error variance of STAI-T 2 (p = .051). Numbers at the ends 
of the shorter, single-headed arrows are error terms. Numbers on the longer, single-headed arrows 
signify path coefficients. Numbers on the curved, double-headed arrows indicate correlation 
coefficients. 
 
Last, we explored the moderating influence of gender by evaluating the significance of the fear x 
gender and anxiety x gender interaction terms when they were independently added to the model with 
covariates. The fear x gender term was not significant (γ = 0.16, SE = 0.11, p = .14), thereby 
indicating that the fear-specific relation with inhibitory control was not moderated by gender. In 
contrast, the anxiety x gender term was significant (γ = 0.18, SE = 0.09, p = .04). A further simple 
slopes analysis revealed that anxiety uniquely and negatively predicted inhibitory control for females 
(B = −0.49, SE = 0.19, p = .012) but not for males (B = −0.09, SE = 0.21, p = .679; see Fig. 2), 
indicating that the anxiety-specific association with inhibitory control was evident only for females, 
but not for males. 
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Fig. 2. Simple slopes analysis of gender moderating the unique relation between trait anxiety 
and inhibitory control with unstandardized estimates (and standard errors in parentheses). 
Latent variable values range from −1 SD to +1 SD for trait anxiety and inhibitory control. 
* p < .05. 
 
5. Discussion 
We found dissimilar unique relations of dispositional fear and anxiety with inhibitory control, even 
when common covariates were controlled for. Specifically, the finding that higher trait fear is 
uniquely concomitant with better inhibitory control dovetails with past work showing that 
experimentally induced fear states augment inhibitory control (Finucane, 2011). Given the 
malleability of inhibitory control (Diamond, 2013), experiences of rational fear may demand more 
top-down and immediate adaptation to cope with the threat, which could in turn translate to more 
proficient inhibitory control. Conversely, we found that higher trait anxiety is uniquely associated 
with lower inhibitory control; this aligns with previous findings that highlight the negative relation 
between trait anxiety and inhibitory control (e.g., Bishop, 2009; Derakshan et al., 2009; Fox, 1993) as 
well as the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), which posits that anxiety impairs top-
down cognitive control. Our findings are also in line with theories (e.g., revised reinforcement 
sensitive theory) that postulate motivational differences between fear and anxiety—owing to the more 
explicit threat specificity in fear than in anxiety—which in turn affect attentional mechanisms (Gray 
& McNaughton, 2000; Harmon-Jones et al., 2013; Öhman, 2008). Specifically, fear sharpens 
attentional focus and promotes inhibitory control, while anxiety broadens attentional scope and 
diminishes inhibitory control. Our study is the first to show the differential unique associations of trait 
fear and trait anxiety with inhibitory control. 
Our results are also consistent with the idea that affective traits comprise valence and motivational 
components. Accordingly, state level relations derived from mood-induction procedures, which more 
strongly activate the motivational aspects of affect, may be attenuated at the trait level when affective 
experiences are averaged over extended periods (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2010). Moreover, 
our results highlight the fact that previous null findings of trait anxiety on inhibitory control using 
neutral stimuli (e.g., Derakshan et al., 2009; Eysenck & Byrne, 1992) could be attributed, in part, to 
the fact that components unrelated to inhibitory control (e.g., negative valence) may mask potential 
relations between trait anxiety and inhibitory control. 
Further, our finding of the significant anxiety x gender interaction effect illuminates a key boundary 
condition. As demonstrated by simple slopes analysis, the negative effect of anxiety on inhibitory 
control (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007) was evident only for females and not for males. Given previous 
findings that females experience higher levels of trait anxiety (as also shown in our study, p = .051), 
anxiety symptoms, and anxiety disorders than males (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2006), our findings imply 
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that females are more susceptible to the deleterious effects of anxiety on inhibitory control. In 
contrast, the absence of an interaction effect of trait fear and gender indicates that the effect of trait 
fear on inhibitory control does not differ between males and females. Taken together, our moderation 
results suggest that higher levels of trait anxiety are concomitant with lower inhibitory control in 
females but not in males. 
Next, our use of bin scores to index inhibitory control is worthy of further discussion. We propose 
three reasons based on findings from our supplementary analyses. First, when we considered other 
performance metrices—such as accuracy, reaction time (RT), and linear integrated speed-accuracy 
score (LISAS; Vandierendonck, 2017)—to reflect the underlying latent factor of inhibition control, 
we found that relative to these metrices (e.g., difference scores in the RT, accuracy, and LISAS), bin 
scores showed the highest factor loadings onto the inhibitory control latent factor 
(see Table A1 of Appendix A). These results indicate that bin scores best represent the inhibitory 
control construct, and therefore are most suitable for purposes of the latent variable approach, which 
is one of the central features of our study. Second, following Vandierendonck (2017), we inspected 
consistency in the directionality of the relations between inhibitory control and speed and accuracy 
scores (see Table A2 of Appendix A). We found that the directions of the effects of trait fear and trait 
anxiety on RT difference scores (reverse-coded) and accuracy scores in the incongruent condition are 
akin to our results based on bin scores. Specifically, trait fear and trait anxiety are positively and 
negatively related to inhibitory control, respectively. Although not all of the effects based on RT and 
accuracy scores reached statistical significance, it is notable that the use of integrated measures (e.g., 
bin scores) may still be advantageous as long as RT and accuracy scores point in the same direction 
(Vandierendonck, 2017)2. Therefore, our use of bin scores is permissible due to the similarity in the 
direction of the effects based on RT and accuracy scores. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of predictors, covariates, and criterion variables. 
 
Our study has several limitations. Foremost, given that dispositional fear and anxiety were assessed 
using global self-reports, they may be susceptible to reporting biases (e.g., recent affective 
experiences; Schwarz & Strack, 1999). However, it should be noted that global self-reports of trait 
negativity are strongly correlated with state negativity and other-reports (e.g., clinicians and family 
members), which demonstrates that global self-report responses are not simply artefacts of response 
biases (Shackman et al., 2016). Nonetheless, future work should employ experiential sampling 
methods to verify our findings. 
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Table 2. Zero-order correlations between predictor, covariates, and criterion variables. 
 
Second, while inhibitory control was indexed by multiple measures, trait fear and trait anxiety were 
primarily measured by the PANAS and the STAI-T, respectively. Moreover, it is possibile that the 
two latent fear and anxiety factors were differentiated not by their constructs, but by construct-
irrelevant aspects (e.g., questionnaire characteristics). For instance, the PANAS relies on single-word 
adjectives (e.g., afraid), while the STAI-T uses short phrases (e.g., “I worry too much over things that 
do not really matter”) and contains reverse-coded items (e.g., “I am happy”). Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that our findings from confirmatory factor analysis show that the item distressed from the 
PANAS loaded onto the anxiety factor—rather than the fear factor, which contain other PANAS 
items—even though other indicators of the anxiety factor are parcels from a different scale (i.e., 
STAI-T). Further, another alternative model in which distressed loaded onto the fear factor, instead of 
the anxiety factor, had a poorer fit relative to our model, χ2(13) = 50.62, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.13, 
SRMR = 0.06, CFI = 0.93. These results show that the item distressed from the PANAS loads onto 
the latent anxiety factor—rather than the latent fear factor—and that the separability of trait fear and 
anxiety was not driven solely by differences in questionnaire characteristics between the PANAS and 
STAI-T. Nevertheless, future research should employ multiple scales to capture each individual latent 
construct of trait fear and trait anxiety, which would more convincingly circumvent differences in 
questionnaire characteristics. 
Third, the correlational design of our study limits causal inferences. It is plausible that greater 
inhibitory control permits the effective engagement of emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal) 
in ameliorating experiences of fear and anxiety. Hence, future studies should consider the potential 
role of emotion regulation in the relation between fear/anxiety and inhibitory control using 
longitudinal designs. 
In conclusion, our findings accentuate the importance of distinguishing fear and anxiety and their 
distinct contributions to inhibitory control. Our findings also highlight the need to consider affective 
traits as multidimensional constructs to achieve a more refined understanding of negative affectivity 
and cognitive processes. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Standardized factor loadings of inhibitory control tasks. 
 
Table A2. Standardized estimates for trait fear and trait anxiety across different latency and 
accuracy scores of inhibitory control tasks. 
 
Note. Standardized estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). Significant results are marked in boldface, p < .05, † p < 
.10. RT = reaction time (reverse-coded by multiplying by −1); ACC = accuracy. -c signifies congruent condition; -i denotes 
incongruent condition; and -d reflects difference scores between incongruent and congruent conditions. 
a Standardized path estimates of trait fear and trait anxiety are unavailable for ACC-d and ACC-c due to model 
nonidentification. 
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